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Simple Justice in the Cradle of
Liberty: Desegregating the Boston
Public Schools
Ronald R. Edmonds*
This Article provides a summary view of the desegregation of
the Boston public schools. Some aspects of teaching and learning in
the Boston schools clearly have improved as a direct consequence
of Boston's desegregation, while others seem little affected. Teach-
ing and learning are mentioned at the outset because later discus-
sion will establish that black Bostonians seek desegregation as part
of their larger and more general quest for improved schooling for
their children.' The success or failure of desegregation therefore may
fairly be judged partly on the basis of its effect upon the quality of
schooling made available to black children. What follows is a dis-
cussion of a mixed set of educational outcomes, judged from the
point of view of black plaintiffs. This much is certain: the current
educational developments in Boston can best be understood when
viewed as a continuation of an enduring black struggle for educa-
tional equity, a struggle that began in Boston in the eighteenth
century.
In their earliest years the Boston schools made no provision
whatever for the education of black children, and black attempts to
gain access to the Boston schools were persistently frustrated. By
1800 blacks had abandoned the quest for access and petitioned in-
stead to have the Boston School Committee create a school explic-
itly set aside for the education of black children.2 Even this effort
to obtain racially separate schools took twenty years to accomplish,
the first black access to public schooling in Boston occurring in
1820.1 The black schools that followed remained unsatisfactory, re-
ceiving treatment that made clear School Committtee disinterest
* Acting Director, Center for Urban Studies, Harvard University Graduate School of
Education. B.A., University of Michigan; M.A., Eastern Michigan University.
1. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 6, 9-10 infra.
2. A separate school for blacks had been established in 1798, under the charge of a white
man, in the house of "a Negro of very good standing." Two years later, however, the local
School Committee refused to grant the petition of sixty-six free blacks to create a separate
school, thus limiting educational facilities for blacks to those volunteered by private citizens.
See C. WOODSON, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO PRIOR TO 1861, at 95 (1919).
3. "An epoch in the history of Negro education in New England was marked in 1820,
when the city of Boston opened its first primary school for the education of colored children."
Id. at 96.
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in, if not contempt for, the education of black children.4
By 1845 the Boston Committee on Grammar Schools was com-
pelled to report that:
Your Committee are aware, that there are many circumstances to be
considered before blame should be laid on any individual, for the present low
state of the [Smith] school .... But they do believe that there is good sense
enough among the parents, and intellect enough among the children, if fairly
enlisted in the subject, and directed by a zealous and discreet [sic] friend, to
create a school which shall reach at least to the rank now attained by one half
of the city schools.
It is to be regretted that the present incumbent has not more faith in the
desire of the colored population for the education of their children, and in the
capacities of the children themselves; for we fear that, without much faith, and
even some enthusiasm, no great harvest can follow the teacher's labors.,
In 1846 eighty-six black Bostonians, persuaded that separate
black schools would remain bad, shifted their tactic for school re-
form and petitioned for an end to racially separate schools:
The undersigned colored citizens of Boston, parents and guardians of
children now attending the exclusive Primary Schools for colored children in
this City, respectfully represent; that the establishment of exclusive schools
for our children is a great injury to us, and deprives us of those equal privileges
and advantages in the public schools to which we are entitled as citizens.
These separate schools cost more and do less for the children than other
schools, since all experience teaches that where a small and despised class are
[sic] shut out from the common benefit of any public institutions of learning
and confined to separate schools, few or none interest themselves about the
schools,-neglect ensues, abuses creep in, the standard of scholarship degen-
erates, and the teachers and the scholars are soon considered and of course
become an inferior class.
But to say nothing of any other reasons for this change, it is sufficient to
say that the establishment of separate schools for our children is believed to
be unlawful, and it is felt to be if not in intention, in fact, insulting. If, as seems
to be admitted, you are violating our rights, we simply ask you to cease doing
SO.
We therefore earnestly request that such exclusive schools be abolished,
and that our children be allowed to attend the Primary Schools established in
the respective Districts in which we live.6
The Boston School Committee rejected the blacks' petition.
In 1849 a black father sought damages for the exclusion of his
daughter from an all-white primary school.7 The Supreme Judicial
Court dismissed the action, holding that the child was not unlaw-
4. One visiting committee, evaluating a Negro public school, stated that: "In regard to
the Smith school, we have come to the conclusion that it is not only in an unsatisfactory,
but in a deplorable condition. The attainments of the scholars are of the lowest grade." 1
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 526 (R. Bremner ed. 1970).
5. Id. at 527 (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 528 (emphasis in original).
7. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
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fully excluded because the Boston School Committee had the power
to establish separate schools for black children.8 Not to be denied,
the black citizenry turned to the Massachusetts Legislature. In 1855
the legislature was persuaded to pass a state law that read in part:
"In determining the qualifications of scholars to be admitted into
any public school or any district school in this Commonwealth, no
distinction shall be made on account of race, color or religious opin-
ions, of the applicant or scholar."' Racially separate schools in Bos-
ton thus were officially ended, and there the matter rested until
modern times.
Black dissatisfaction with the Boston schools took a dramatic
turn in 1963 and 1964. In each of those years thousands of black
children were kept out of Boston schools in a boycott intended to
dramatize black dissatisfaction with the quality of teaching and
learning for black children.'" In response to these new pressures,
the Massachusetts State Board of Education and the Massachu-
setts Legislature joined forces in 1965 to pass the Nation's first
"Racial Imbalance Act."" The legislation, which was intended to
end segregation in Boston, states that it is the public policy of
Massachusetts:
to encourage all school committees to adopt as educational objectives the
promotion of racial balance and the correction of existing racial imbalance in
8. Id. at 208-09. For a general discussion of Boston's reluctance to desegregate its public
schools, see WOODSON, supra note 2, at 317-25.
9. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 535 (R. Bremner ed. 1970).
10. In 1960 approximately 80% of black elementary school students attended majority
black schools. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATING THE BOSTON PuLC
SCHOOLS: A CRISIS IN Civic RESPONSIBILITY xiv (1975) [hereinafter cited as CIrM RIGHTS
COMM'N]. In 1961 the Boston public schools adopted a policy of "open enrollment" that
allowed black students to transfer to predominantly white schools. As noted by the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, however, the open enrollment policy "achieved nothing
as far as school integration was concerned, since white students were also free to transfer from
schools whose compositions were not to their liking." Id. at xiv-xv.
11. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15, §§ I1-1K (West Supp. 1978); id. ch. 71, §§ 37C-37D
(West Supp. 1978). The Act evolved from an April 1965 report of an advisory committee
appointed by the State Board of Education and the Commissioner of Education to study
racial segregation in the Massachusetts and Boston public schools. Named the Kiernan
Report after the then Commissioner of Education for the Commonwealth, the report con-
cluded that 45 Boston schools were "imbalanced"-having more than 50% nonwhite stu-
dents-and that such racial imbalance was educationally harmful and should be ended. The
Report also noted that "[o]pen enrollment alone cannot achieve school integration. Relying
on open enrollment places the responsibility for school integration on the uncoordinated
actions of thousands of parents, rather than on the planned actions of schools themselves."
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 10, at xv (quoting ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RAcIAL IMBALANCE
AND EDUCATION: MASSACHUSETTS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT-
EDUCATIONALLY 4 (1965)).
The Boston School Committee responded to the Kiernan Report by refusing to acknowl-
edge that racial imbalance was a problem that ought to be ended or that was educationally
harmful. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 417 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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the public schools. The prevention or elimination of racial imbalance shall be
an objective in all decisions involving the drawing or altering of school atten-
dance lines, establishing of grade levels, and the selection of new school sites.'
2
Despite the Racial Imbalance Act, however, the School Committee
did not move to alter the racial character of the great many racially
imbalanced schools existing in Boston in 1965.13
Black parents responded by organizing Operation Exodus, a
private program for transporting black students to underutilized,
predominantly white schools." The presumption was that black
children could occupy empty seats in white schools. The 1965 presi-
dent of black Boston's parent association remembers the alternative
solutions considered in the association's nightly meetings.
The first consisted of forming a human chain of parents around a school and
not allowing anyone to trespass. Secondly, some parents wanted to pressure
more extensively, by using petitions and pickets. The third idea was to have
sit-ins by parents in both classrooms and the School Committee office. Almost
by a process of elimination, we voted against all three proposals because in all
instances the inconvenience would be to ourselves and our children, just as in
previous demonstrations, producing short-range results. We arrived at the
position of mass displacement of Negro children, now called Exodus, in order
to take advantage of the 7,000 vacant seats throughout the city and available
under the Open Enrollment Policy. Problems arose around this decision: how
to transport, and where to finance. We called a final meeting on September
8th, attended by 600 community people. At 12:30 that night, we found our-
selves with 250 children to bus and with many families committed to our
program. We left the meeting and embarked on a wild recruitment program
to round up transportation. We called all through the night until 4 a.m., and
wound up having seven buses donated by private organizations and civil rights
groups. At 8 a.m. September 9, 1965, all buses, cars and children were ready
to roll. The money for our buses was donated by various groups, such as the
NAACP, labor unions, and from many individuals. The second day of school,
we had financial support from merchants and businessmen in our immediate
community. Thus, the die had been cast. 5
By the 1967-68 school year, Operation Exodus was busing 600 black
children from Boston's overcrowded black schools to Boston's
underutilized white schools at an approximate annual cost of
$180,000.18 These monies were private and were raised entirely by
black parents.
12. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37C (West Supp. 1978).
13. In 1966 the School Committee unsuccessfully attacked the constitutionality of the
Act in School Committee v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). At that time the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that "[tihe committee seems bent on stifling the act before it has a fair chance to
become fully operative." Id. at 698, 227 N.E.2d at 733.
14. See J. TEELE, EVALUATING SCHOOL BUSING: CASE STUDY or BOSTON'S OPERATION
ExoDus 6-11 (1973).
15. Id. at 10-11.
16. Id. at 14.
[Vol. 31:887
19781 BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
In 1966 Metco (Metropolitan Council for Educational Oppor-
tunity, Inc.) joined the repertoire of voluntary efforts to provide
Boston's black children with access to schools offering a modicum
of effective instruction." Metco sought black parents who would
volunteer to have their children bused to suburban schools that had
made space available for limited numbers of black children from
Boston. From its beginning until the present time, Metco has had
a waiting list of black children for the limited number of available
suburban spaces.18
The most recent tactic in black Boston's quest for educational
equity" is Morgan v. Hennigan,2 ' a class action suit filed in federal
court alleging that the Boston public schools were segregated and
discriminatory. In 1974 the district court found for plaintiffs and
ruled that the Boston public schools were in fact racially separate
and had been made so by discriminatory means." Having so ruled,
17. Both the Metco and Exodus programs for transporting black pupils to predomi-
nantly white schools were started by black parents as private projects, with state financing
coming later. 379 F. Supp. at 424.
18. In June 1974 the program provided transportation for approximately 1,650 pupils.
Id.
19. Despite the Racial Imbalance Act and programs such as Exodus and Metco, the
Boston public schools remained racially segregated. By 1971, 62% of black students attended
schools that were more than 70% black. Cwm R IGrs COMM'N, supra note 10, at xvi.
Moreover, in seeking desegregation of the public schools the black community and the
State Board of Education faced continued opposition by the Boston School Committee. In
addition to challenging the constitutionality of the Racial Imbalance Act, see note 13 supra,
the committee also successfully challenged the withholding of state funds for noncompliance
with the Racial Imbalance Act. School Committee v. Board of Educ., 363 Mass. 20, 292
N.E.2d 338 (1973). The Committee unsuccessfully challenged the State Board of Educa-
tion's plan for correcting imbalance in the Boston public schools. School Committee v.
Board of Educ., 364 Mass. 199, 302 N.E.2d 916 (1973). In 1974 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts found that the Committee had not complied with the orders of the State
Board or the court, and stated that several of the Committee's submissions manifested a
continued attempt to delay implementation of the racial imbalance plan. For a review of state
court litigation involving the Racial Imbalance Act, see 379 F. Supp. at 418-20.
20. 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). Plaintiffs alleged that the Boston School Com-
mittee (city defendants) had intentionally caused and maintained racial segregation in the
Boston public schools, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 415. Plaintiffs also alleged that certain administrative practices by the
State Board of Education (state defendants) had violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights.
Id. The city defendants responded by claiming that the disproportionate number of blacks
and whites was caused by residential segregation; the state defendants responded that they
had little control over the city defendants and that they had done as much as possible to
eliminate racial segregation in the schools. Id. at 415-16.
21. Id. at 482. The court concluded that "the defendants have knowingly carried out a
systematic program of segregation affecting all of the city's students, teachers and school
facilities and have intentionally brought about and maintained a dual school system." Id.
In reaching this conclusion the district court examined six aspects of the Boston public
schools. These were (1) facilities utilization and new structures (Id. at 425-32), (2) districting
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presiding Judge Arthur Garrity was faced with the urgent obligation
to end discrimination in the Boston public schools, to eliminate the
racially separate schools, and to remedy, so far as was practical, the
past harms of segregation.
In responding to this task, the court faced several major obsta-
cles. As I have noted, in the decade of the 1960's Boston's black
parents repeatedly pressed for instructional reform, and black activ-
ism and organization rallied around the cry for better schools. Partly
in response to Boston's municipal parochialism, there grew up in the
1960's a generation of local politicians whose principal platform was
opposition to desegregation.2 2 In the spring of 1975 when the district
court issued its "Student Desegregation Plan,"' these local politi-
cians set the tone of vituperation and contempt for the law that
characterized Boston's 1975 discourse on desegregation.24
The social science literature since the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education25 identifies local leadership as the
most critical variable in determing the climate within which deseg-
regation will occur .2 Those communities whose desegregation is or-
and redistricting (Id. at 432-41), (3) feeder patterns (Id. at 441-49), (4) open enrollment and
controlled transfer (Id. at 449-56), (5) faculty and staff (Id. at 456-66), and (6) examination
and vocational schools and programs (Id. at 466-76). The court found that defendants had
acted in these areas to intentionally segregate the schools. Id. at 480-81. For example, in
examining the feeder system by which students from intermediate schools were channelled
to the city's eighteen "city-wide" high schools, the court stated that "[t]he only consistent
basis for the feeder pattern designations, changes and deletions was the racial factor. Neither
distances between schools, capacities of receiving schools, means of transportation or natural
boundaries explain them." Id. at 446.
With regard to the state defendants, the court held that they had done everything
possible to force the city defendants to comply with state and federal law. Id. at 476.
22. For example, while the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 appeared to represent a signifi-
cant step forward toward integration, debate over the Act revealed an intensity of opposition
foreshadowing future problems. Indeed, at the same time the Boston School Department was
notifying parents and students of new school assignments for 1974, moves were being planned
in a number of quarters to thwart desegregation efforts. The governor and many state legisla-
tors promised to seek repeal or modification of portions of the Racial Imbalance Act. CIVIL
RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 10, at xv-xvii.
23. See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
24. For example, the United States Civil Rights Commission described the conduct of
Boston mayor Kevin White as follows:
Following the Federal district court's decision in June 1974, Mayor Kevin White
made a series of public pronouncements which, taken together, were ambivalent. While
never supporting the constitutional mandate to desegregate Boston's public schools, the
mayor did take the position that he would uphold the law. However, his several pro-'
nouncements concerning opposition to the desegregation order undercut his frequent
statements on upholding the law.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 10, at 29.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. See SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: MAKING IT WORK (R. Green ed. 1976). Emphasis was
placed on the role of the school superintendent, the community's educational leader, in
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derly and educationally productive have elected officials and busi-
ness and civic leaders who generally lead the community in under-
standing and accepting principles of constitutional law as applied
to the desegregation process.Y Those communities like Boston
whose desegregation is characterized by violence, disorder, and edu-
cational malaise have elected officials and business and civic lead-
ers who characteristically join in distorting the truth and subverting
the law. Equally significant in such circumstances, no counter
voices are raised, and those leaders who are not parties to the disor-
der remain silent while it proceeds. Such was the situation in Boston
in the summer of 1975.
Thus, when Boston's desegregated schools opened in Septem-
ber, the streets became battlegrounds between busing opponents
and law enforcement officials. Hundreds were arrested, buses were
vandalized, schools were disrupted, and pupils were terrorized.29
These events occurred largely through the encouragement of a cli-
implementing school desegregation. Id. at 39. Furthermore, school board members were as-
signed a vital role. Id. at 59. See also CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 10, at 1 ("a vital
element in successful school desegregation is the support of leaders from all segements [sic]
of the community; political, governmental, religious, civic, economic, educational, and reli-
gious among others").
27. Each school desegregation case is unique. Yet, there are factors common to
most cases. There are many determinants of whether or not the community will be
desegregated peacefully and successfully in the earliest implementation stage: the qual-
ity of human leadership; community acceptance of the decision and involvement in the
planning for desegregation; the attitudes of parents, students, and school personnel; help
or lack of it from the business community; help or lack of it from political leaders and
elected officials; the comprehensiveness and specificity of the court order; and the will-
ingness of all segments of the community to obey that order.
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: MAKING IT WORK 42 (R. Green ed. 1976).
28. See notes 22 & 24, supra.
29. In his opinion in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.), affl'd, 530 F.2d
401 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), Judge Garrity described the opening of
the schools as follows:
The opening of school under the state plan in September of 1974 was accompanied
by some violence and much fear. School buses were stoned, their windows broken and
some children cut by shattered glass. Angry crowds of white parents and students gath-
ered in front of schools to protest the entry of black students assigned there. Student
boycotts of varying effectiveness were organized. Many students stayed home or were
kept home by their parents out of fear for their personal safety. Several city high schools
were the scenes of racially-connected fights and incidents .. . . State troopers joined
city police in large numbers in troubled areas, such as predominantly white South
Boston and Hyde Park. . . . In December a white student was stabbed inside South
Boston High School by a black student. Community residents gathered and surrounded
the high school building, trapping black students inside until a decoy operation by police
permitted the departure of the black students. In the aftermath of this incident, all
schools in the South Boston-Roxbury district were closed early for the Christmas vaca-
tion and reopened late, and then only against advice of city and state police officials who
urged the permanent closing of South Boston High.
Id. at 224-25.
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mate of aggressive irresponsibility against which the court stood,
very nearly alone.
In formulating its plans for desegregating the Boston school
system, the court had to overcome unexpected, monumental, and
tenacious obstacles to desegregation. The court found itself faced
with an unresponsive school committee, a bloated and largely inef-
fective school bureaucracy, and an obligation to desegregate Bos-
ton's schools with more than deliberate speed. Presiding District
Court Judge Arthur Garrity first ordered defendant Boston School
Committee to begin formulating a plan to end segregation in the
public schools." In addition, the court, as a temporary measure,
enjoined defendants"1 from failing to comply with a partial desegre-
gation plan32 formulated in 1973 by the Massachusetts State De-
partment of Education in response to the Racial Imbalance Act.
Dissatisfied with the state plan, the School Committee in July 1974
requested time to prepare a substitute temporary plan. The court
gave the School Committee until July 29 to formulate a plan; at the
end of this time the Committee reported that it had been unable to
prepare a satisfactory substitute for the state plan. Thus, lacking an
alternative, the court ordered that the state plan be put into effect.
3
The plan which Judge Garrity ordered the School Committee
to temporarily implement on June 21, 1974, thus was wholly created
by Massachusetts state agencies. The School Committee not only
had been offered a role in creating this plan, but had been aware of
the plan for some time and in fact had been under orders to comply
with it. While Judge Garrity, the School Committee, and the plain-
tiffs certainly never considered the plan to be a satisfactory perma-
nent remedy for the violations Judge Garrity had found, it was
considered to be a workable temporary solution. Accordingly, that
plan was put into effect during the 1974-75 school year.34 This plan
30. Partial Judgment and Interlocutory Order, 379 F. Supp. at 484 ("[D]efendants are
further Ordered to begin forthwith the formulation and implementation of plans which shall
eliminate every form of racial segregation in the public schools of Boston, including all
consequences and vestiges of segregation previously practiced by the defendants.").
31. Id.
32. The state plan aimed to reduce the number of majority black schools from 68 to 44
and the number of black children attending "imbalanced" schools from approximately 30,000
to approximately 10,000. To accomplish these goals the plan called for redistricting and
busing. Id. at 483.
33. Id. at 484. (ID]efendants (shall] be preliminarily enjoined from (a) failing to
comply with the Racial Imbalance Act plan ordered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts to be implemented on or before the opening day of school in September, 1974.") For
a more complete discussion of the interaction between Judge Garrity and the School Commit-
tee, see 401 F. Supp. at 224.
34. See J. ADKiNS, J. McHuGH, & K. SEAY, DESEGREGATION: THE BOSTON ORDERS AND
THm ORIGINS 24 (1975).
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was implemented in the context of elaborate "remedial guidelines"
under which the School Committee was to function. School authori-
ties were charged with the affirmative duty of taking all steps neces-
sary to secure the rights of the plaintiff class, including busing,
repairing the schools, redistricting, involuntary student and faculty
assignments, and all other means, regardless of how distasteful to
school officials, teachers, and parents, to achieve a unitary school
system.35
As the temporary plan was being implemented, the court pro-
ceeded immediately to develop a permanent plan for desegregating
Boston's schools. To that end, the School Committee was ordered
to present a desegregation plan by December. In December, the
School Committee refused to plan for Boston's desegregation.37
Plaintiffs asked that the School Committee be held in contempt,
but the court declined and instead directed the School Committee
to try once more to develop and authorize a plan.38 This time the
School Committee reluctantly complied and on January 27, 1975,
submitted to the court what was, in effect, a freedom of choice plan
that did not provide for busing as an instrument of desegregation.3 9
The court concluded that the School Committee plan would not
achieve actual desegregation and moved therefore to a more active
role in planning for Boston's desegregation. °
On January 31, 1975, the court appointed two experts to assist
in formulating a desegregation plan." The experts, Dr. Robert A.
35. 379 F. Supp. at 482.
36. Order Requiring Creation of Desegregation Plan (October 31, 1974). This order,
which is documented in 401 F. Supp. at 225, required the filing of progress reports on the
development of the plan and filing of the plan itself on December 16, 1974. The court stated
that:
the student desegregation plan shall provide for the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation of all grades in all schools in all parts of the city. . . . [The defendants
shall utilize as a starting point and keep in mind the goal that the racial composition of
the student body of every school should generally reflect the ratio of white and black
students enrolled at that grade level of schools. . . throughout the system.
37. On December 16, 1974, the deadline date for filing a desegregation plan, the School
Committee voted three to two not to approve for filing the plan developed at the direction of
the School Committee. Id. at 226.
38. The court denied plaintiffs' motions to hold defendants in criminal contempt. It
granted the motion to hold in civil contempt the three members of the School Committee
who voted against submission of the plan, but provided that defendant could purge the
holding of civil contempt by voting to authorize submission of a plan. On January 7, 1975,
the School Committee voted to authorize and file a plan. Id.
39. Id. at 228. The court stated that the plan of January 27 "was constitutionally
inadequate because it did not promise realistically to desegregate the public schools." Id.
40. "[A~ny plan that places complete reliance on parental choice to desegregate Bos-
ton's schools cannot be constitutionally adopted. Such plans must be rejected where, as here,
there are more effective methods of desegregation reasonably available." Id.
41. Order Appointing Experts (January 31, 1975) in substitution for Judge Garrity's
19781
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Dentler and Dr. Marvin B. Scott, the Dean and Associate Dean of
Boston University's School of Education, are still at work. Since
their appointment they have evaluated proposed plans, suggested
modifications, monitored implementation, and otherwise acted as
professional staff for the court. On February 7, 1975, the court also
appointed four masters whose task was to review any and all plans
for desegregation submitted to the court and to hold hearings and
take such testimony as might assist the masters in recommending
to the court a plan for desegration.4 2 The masters were Francis Kep-
pel, former United States Commissioner of Education; Edward J.
McCormack, Jr., former Massachusetts Attorney General; Jacob J.
Spiegel, a retired Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice;
and Charles V. Willie, a Harvard Professor of Education. These four
men proceeded to examine various means by which Boston might
be desegregated and recommended an innovative approach that
included the school-university pairings to be discussed in a subse-
quent portion of this Article. 3 The plan for permanent desegrega-
tion that was ordered to be implemented in September 1975 was
made up of recommendations from the masters, analyses by the
experts, critiques from defendants, petitions from plaintiffs, and
finally the court's summary judgment of how best to obtain maxi-
mum feasible desegregation." At its core the plan sought racial
balance through busing, with generous provisions for magnet
schools. 45
Order of October 31, 1974. The order established the filing date and general contents of the
student desegregation plan that was to be filed by defendant School Committee (see note 36
supra) and reiterated the court's directive of December 30, 1974, to the School Committee to
once again attempt to formulate a desegregation plan. The above-mentioned court orders and
other judicial proceedings precipitated by the Hennigan decision on June 21, 1974, are docu-
mented in 401 F. Supp. at 224-27.
42. Order of Appointment and Reference to Masters (February 2, 1975) (documented
in 401 F. Supp. at 227).
43. See notes 67-71 infra and accompanying text.
44. Order Promulgating Student Desegregation Plan (May 10, 1975). This remedial
order issued by Judge Garrity is documented and explained in the opinion of June 5, 1975,
401 F. Supp. at 227-50. Excerpts from the Student Desegregation Plan are contained in that
opinion at 250-70.
45. Regarding the legal principles governing formulation of the plan, the court stated
in part that a desegregation plan must eliminate "racial identifiability" of schools; it held
that "[tihe test of identifiability then becomes substantial disproportion in composition
compared to the racial composition of the school system." Id. at 232. Judge Garrity also noted
that the possibility of "white flight" was not a consideration to be weighed against the rights
of plaintiffs in considering the remedy. Id. at 233.
The plan sought to correct racial imbalance through two major methods. See id. at 249.
The first established a network of citywide magnet schools with distinctive features, including
a system of pairing local colleges and universities with each citywide school. The court stated
that "[tihe goal of this arrangement is to make the school distinctive and attractive because
of its concentration on the arts, or the classics, or on open space teaching methods, for
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Two summary points are important at this stage. First, in com-
menting on the level of court intiative in developing a plan, Judge
Garrity observed:
Education is a matter entrusted initially to elected local authorities and ap-
pointed state authorities. Even after unlawful segregation has been found,
responsibility falls initially upon the local school authorities to remedy the
effects of this segregation. . . .Only the default of the school committee in
this case has obliged the court to employ the help of the appointed experts and
masters and to draw an adequate plan."
Second, in discussing the use of busing in the plan, Judge Garrity
further observed:
[T]he court does not favor forced busing. Nor, for that matter, have the
plaintiffs advocated forced busing. What the plaintiffs seek, and what the law
of the land as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States com-
mands, is that plaintiffs' right to attend desegregated schools be realized. That
right cannot lawfully be limited to walk-in schools. . . .If there were a way
to accomplish desegregation in Boston without transporting students to
schools beyond walking distance, the court and all parties would much prefer
that alternative. In past years, feasible proposals that would have substan-
tially lessened segregation through redistricting without busing were made by
various public agencies and uniformly rejected or evaded by the Boston School
Committee. The harvest of these years of obstruction and of maintenance of
segregated schools is that today, given the locations and capacities of its school
buildings and the racial concentrations of its populations, Boston is simply not
a city that can provide its black schoolchildren with a desegregated education
absent considerable mandatory transportation.'
Having devised and ordered a plan for permanent desegrega-
example." Id. at 236. These provisions were designed to attract students voluntarily to deseg-
regated schools. The court also created pairings for district schools. Id. See notes 67-71 infra
and accompanying text.
The second major method the court used to correct racial imbalance was the creation of
new school districts and assignment guidelines. In creating the districts, the court noted that
it tried to minimize required transportation. 401 F. Supp. at 239. Furthermore, the court took
equitable considerations into account: it did not order busing to desegregate 95% white East
Boston, in part because this would "require transporting between four and five thousand
children either into or out of other parts of Boston, many through the tunnels with their gassy
air at heavy traffic hours, for distances of up to 5.2 miles one way." Id. at 238.
Once it abolished racially identifiable schools, the assignment guidelines for particular
schools were guided by two considerations: allowing students to attend schools near their
homes, and minimizing the sense of isolation experienced by a minority, black or white, in
any school. Id. at 241. To accommodate these interests, the guidelines provided that the
allowable variation in racial composition depended on the size of the racial group considered.
The court reasoned that a large group could suffer a large reduction in numbers before it
would feel isolated, and that a small group reduced by the same number might "feel isolated,
uneasy and defensive." Id.
The plan also provided for creation and continuation of citizen organizations to partici-
pate in and monitor the desegregation process. Id. at 248-49. See notes 72-79 infra and
accompanying text.
46. 401 F. Supp. at 230.
47. Id. at 239.
19781
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tion, the court turned to problems of implementation. Recognizing
School Committee intransigence, the court created a citizen body
whose task was to monitor the implementation of the "Student
Desegregation Plan" that was fully implemented during the 1975-
76 school year. This body, known as the Citywide Coordinating
Council (CCC), consisted of forty-four citizens (since reduced to
fifteen) who represented various community organizations, business
and labor, colleges and universities, and public school parents and
students." The CCC and its professional staff functions as the eyes
and ears of the court; consequently, it maintains constant commu-
nication with the court.4 9 Every aspect of desegregation is moni-
tored, assessed, described, and analyzed periodically by the CCC.
The court thus has been assured of an objective and reliable
measure of progress toward desegregation in every segment of the
Boston public schools. The CCC will cease to exist on September
1978.50
A Department of Implementation has been established within
the Boston School Department and is responsible for monitoring all
aspects of Boston's desegregation.5 1 The presumption is that any
School Committee or School Department action resulting in re-
segregation would be noted by the Department of Implementation,
which would then prompt the School Committee or School Depart-
ment to rescind its action and, if necessary, to adopt corrective
measures. The success of such an arrangement depends upon the
effectiveness of the Department of Implementation. In this regard,
the court order establishing the Department prescribed that it be
staffed in conformity with the court's standards of selection and
desegregation, and that it be designed to a higher standard of com-
petence than is ordinarily true of the Boston School Committee and
School Department. One may reasonably predict that, once the
court withdraws, fear of the court's return to active participation
may not only keep Boston's desegregation in force, but also may
48. Order Appointing Citywide Coordinating Council (May 30, 1975) (documented in
401 F. Supp. at 265).
49. The CCC:
will be the primary body monitoring implementation [of the desegregation orders] on
behalf of the court. It will in this connection file monthly reports with the parties and
the court covering its activities. . . . It may bring unresolved problems to the attention
of the parties, the court or other appropriate persons. It may communicate and publicize
its views and recommendations to the public, the parties and the court.
Id.
50. Boston Evening Globe, June.2, 1978, at 29.
51. Memorandum and Orders Modifying Desegregation Plan (May 6, 1977) (copy on
file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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permit the Department of Implementation to perform as the court
intended.
The court demonstrated its capacity for forcefulness when it
placed South Boston High School in receivership in December
1975.5 South Boston High had been a continuous scene of disorder
and disruption, displaying open school staff hostility to black pupils
sent there by court order.53 By December the court recognized no
prospect for improvement in the school. 4 Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, the court was anxious to demonstrate the tenac-
ity of its commitment to desegregation and the lengths to which it
would go when circumstances required.5 Therefore, on December
9th the court placed South Boston High in receivership, naming as
receiver the superintendent of the Boston schools, and ordered ad-
ministrative and coaching personnel transferred from the school. In
April 1976, following a national search, the court ordered the School
Committee to appoint a new administrative team to South Boston
High School.M The school is now orderly and greatly improved in the
quality of its teaching and learning. The receivership remains in
effect.
We must consider now desegregation matters that have not
52. Written Order re South Boston High School (December 9, 1975). While the court
dictated on December 9 numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which this
order was based, supplementary findings and conclusions on the motion concerning South
Boston High School, as well as documentation of the December 9 order, are contained in
Judge Garrity's opinion of December 16, 1975. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D.
Mass. 1975). There was precedent for placing a school in receivership in a civil rights case.
In Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966), the School Board of Taliaferro,
Georgia, in order to frustrate a desegregation plan required by the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, bused the county's white students to schools in neighbor-
ing counties. The court removed the School Board and appointed as receiver the superintend-
ent of schools for the state of Georgia. See generally CiviL RIomrs COMM'N, supra note 10, at
63-65; Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RuTGERs L. REv. 115 (1969).
53. As a unit, the faculty reportedly felt put upon by desegregation, and this attitude
impeded integration of the school. The pervasive hostility of the majority of white teachers
at the high school was reflected in faculty meeting dialogue between white and black faculty
members. See 409 F. Supp. at 1147-48.
54. The court stated: "The most difficult issue involved in deciding [whether to place
South Boston High School in temporary receivership] . . . is whether the required changes
can occur under the leadership of its distinguished headmaster . . and his team of loyal
administrative assistants. The court has come to the firm conclusion that they cannot." Id.
at 1150.
55. See Order Containing Supplemental Findings and Conclusions re South Boston
High School (December 16, 1975) (documented in 409 F. Supp. at 1150-51) (in which the
court, in support of its decision to place the school in receivership, stated that "SBHS is
preoccupied with policing and not getting at the causes of hate"). See also Order re Facilities
at South Boston High School (December 24, 1975) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review) (in which the court outlined specific renovation and repair needs of the high school).
56. Memorandum and Order re Appointment of South Boston High School Headmaster
(April 7, 1976) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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prompted the court to be as forceful as it might. On the basis of its
own standards for desegregation, the court's greatest failing is in its
efforts to desegregate Boston school personnel. The trial in Morgan
v. Hennigan had found segregation and discrimination in the per-
sonnel practices in the Boston public schools.57 In response to that
finding, and noting that black pupils comprised more than forty
percent of the school population in January 1975, the court ordered
the School Committee to implement affirmative action procedures
to bring black teachers to twenty percent of the total.5 As of May
1978, black teachers comprised about twelve percent of the total59
with little prospect of that proportion rising to twenty percent. De-
spite the court's order for staff desegregation, the Boston School
Department and School Committee have maintained personnel
practices resulting in the busing throughout a hostile community of
black children who are then not met in the classroom by adequate
numbers of black teachers. The court is to be criticized for a stan-
dard of equity that pursues black pupil dispersal with great vigor
without an equal commitment to the nondiscriminatory employ-
ment of black personnel throughout the Boston schools.
This Article employs black pupil performance as a principal
measure of the equity of desegregation."0 Judged by such a standard,
court-ordered desegregation has a decidedly mixed record. On the
basis of existing research literature, following desegregation some
black pupils do better, some do worse, and some do about the same
as they did in previously segregated facilities." After greater than a
57. See Plaintiffs' Requests for Findings (March 1973) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review) (which indicated that only 6% of the faculty in Boston's 204 schools were black,
and that 75% of that number were assigned to schools that enrolled more than 50% black
students). See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 595 (1st Cir. 1974) (which acknowl-
edged the district court's finding that the Boston school system was segregated as to faculty
and staff, as well as students, and stated that such segregation is "among the most important
indicia of a segregated system").
58. Order for Desegregation of Administrative Staff (February 24, 1976). See also Mem-
orandum and Orders on Faculty Recruiting and Hiring, 388 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1975),
aff'd, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
59. Boston Evening Globe, June 2, 1978, at 29.
60. In most studies on the outcome of desegregation, the criterion is the raw or grade-
equivalent score on a standardized achievement test. In a few studies "mental ability" or
"scholastic aptitude" or IQ is the criterion available. It generally is acknowledged that there
are significant problems in the predictive value of such measures. N. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL
DESEGREGATON: OUTCOMES FOR CmILDREN 17 (1975).
61. The Equality of Educational Opportunity Service conducted a national survey of
desegregated schools, and the data produced received extensive analysis. A 1966 study indi-
cated that the proportion of white students in a school was positively related to individual
performance, but that the effect appeared to be accounted for "by other characteristics of
the student body than the racial composition per se." Further analysis in 1968, however,
showed that school desegregation is associated with higher achievement for black pupils only
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decade of research, there have been no definitive positive findings.
Adequate data has not yet been gathered to determine a causal
relation between racial composition and racial achievement.2 White
pupil performance, on the other hand, is not affected by desegrega-
tion . 3 In sum, desegregation in and of itself neither causes nor pre-
cludes gains in performance for black pupils. Nevertheless, desegre-
gation has been the greatest occasion of educational gain in the
modern history of the Boston public schools. Boston public schools
are still unsatisfactory, but they are not as bad as they once
were 6-and in Boston, that is a great gain. There is no evidence to
suggest that, absent court intervention, any educational reform ben-
efiting black children would have come to pass in the Boston
schools. Because it is premature to subject Boston's desegregation
to rigorous pupil performance analysis, this Article will not give
close attention to evaluations of pupil performance in discussing
Boston's desegregation. There are, however, a number of court-
ordered school reforms that auger well for the future quality of
schooling in Boston.
First, the court has substantially reformed and regularized the
selection and placement of administrative personnel in school build-
ings and in the central offices of the School Department. 5 Histori-
cally, one became a principal or central administrator in the Boston
schools exclusively by promotion from within the school system, and
promotion required a personal champion on the Boston School
Committee. Regrettably, School Committee members often chose
those to be championed largely on the basis of their willingness to
give financial support to the School Committee member at election
time. Such practices ceased when desegregation came, but not be-
fore Boston was administratively staffed at a rate 400 percent
greater than were school districts of comparable size. 6 One of the
ironies of desegregation is that the quest for equity for black chil-
dren must inevitably accrue to the even greater benefit of white
if they are in predominantly white classrooms, but that desegregation is favorable irrespective
of the percentage of white students. A 1972 study then reaffirmed the 1966 conclusions that
racial composition has little effect on black academic achievement when school quality and
the background of individuals and their peers are controlled. Id. at 19-20.
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id. at 32.
64. See Boston Public Schools, CITY-WIDE Pupi. AcmEvamENrr PROFILES 1972-1974,
at 5, 9 (March 1975) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
65. See Order re Administrator Desegregation (February 24, 1976) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
66. These conclusions are based on the author's interviews and conversations with
teaching and administrative personnel of the Boston public schools. I conducted the inter-
views in October of 1975, 1976, and 1977, as a representative of the Citywide Coordinating
Council and of the Freedom House Coalition, both organizations that monitor desegregation
in the Boston public schools.
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children. Boston is no exception. Attempts to reform administrative
selection in the Boston public schools have for many years met with
total failure. Now, despite halting progress, Boston is moving to-
ward a system of administrative selection based largely on candi-
date merit. My own evaluation of the politics of educational deci-
sionmaking in Boston leads me to conclude that absent the court's
order for administrative desegregation, the School Committee
would have prevented even the progress toward personnel reform
that is now underway.
The court has brought about a second major school reform by
initiating dramatic and unprecedented intercourse between Boston
schools and area universities, businesses, and cultural institutions.
In devising the plan for Boston's desegregation, Judge Garrity
sought the means by which quality education might become a part
of the desegregation process.6 7 To that end, in 1975 the court invited
twenty-two Boston area colleges and universities to "support, assist,
and participate in the development of educational excellence within
and among the public schools of Boston."6 In response, each college
and university developed a relationship with one or more Boston
schools. The pairings are now in their third year of operation and
have been supported by upwards of eight million dollars in state
funds. 9 The pairings presently serve more than two-thirds of the
65,000 Boston public school students, and the number of participat-
ing colleges and universities has grown to twenty-four.7 ° While the
pairings vary in their activities, most are characterized by the fol-
lowing:
1. Almost all pairings have planned for extensive parent outreach and in-
volvement, through a variety of paid and unpaid roles. Parent "coordinators,"
"parent liaison committees," or "community relations specialists" are the
most consistently undertaken activities in the pairings.
2. Almost all pairings provide for at least a half-time university staff person
to coordinate university involvement. The extent to which the other university
faculty are involved varies greatly from project to project. Somewhat less
uniform are the requests by schools for a co-project director; such requests
range from one-half release-time for a teacher to designation of an assistant
principal as co-project director at no cost.
3. Most projects focus on a combination of direct services to students through
diagnostic testing, tutoring, additional teacher aides, materials, field trips and
guidance services and direct services to teachers and administrators through
inservice workshops, college courses, curriculum development, and on-site
consultation.
7'
67. See Hunt, McMillan, & Worth, University-School Collaboration in Boston, 16
INTEGRATED EDuc. 21, 21 (March-April.1978).
68. 401 F. Supp. at 259.
69. See Hunt, McMillan, & Worth, supra note 67, at 21.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 22.
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The pairings are mixed in their richness and productivity but they
unquestionably have enhanced the life of Boston schools and their
students.
Excepting only the actual desegregation of the schools, the
court's most profound impact on the Boston schools has been the
court-ordered parent participation in the life of the schools. Histori-
cally, the Boston public schools have been closed. Nonschool per-
sonnel were permitted in the schools at the pleasure of principals,
and principal pleasure extended only to a very few who were almost
always white.72 The historic organization for Boston public school
parents is the Home and School Association. That the Association
entered Morgan v. Kerrigan as an amicus curiae73 on behalf of defen-
dant School Committee indicates the Association's bias in favor of
the discriminatory status quo that prevailed before the instant suit.
Fortunately, the court moved early in the remedial phase of the
litigation to devise legitimate nondiscriminatory parent-school or-
ganizations. Beginning in October 1974, the court ordered the crea-
tion of a multi-tiered citizen advisory structure whose elected par-
ent members are multiracial.7 In addition, each Boston school has
a Racial Ethnic Parent Council (REPC),7 5 and each of Boston's nine
school districts has a Community District Advisory Council
(CDAC)76 composed of elected parents, high school students, and
court-appointed citizens. Finally, an all parent, elected Citywide
Parents Advisory Council (CPAC) consisting entirely of parents has
been established.77 The court has characterized the role of these
multiracial, democratically elected parent groups as follows:
All matters which are apt to facilitate or hinder the desegregation process
in particular schools or districts or citywide are appropriate subject matters
for citizen concern and action, e.g., implementation of Court orders for special
72. These conclusions are based on my interviews of representatives of more than forty
organizations that either represent or serve minority parents in Boston. See Edmonds,
Desegregation and Equity: Community Perspectives, 19 HARv. GRADUATE SCH. oF EDuc. A.
BULL., No. 2 (Winter 1974-1975).
73. The Boston Home and School Association is listed as a party in 388 F. Supp. 581.
The Association's resistance to desegregation was acknowledged in 401 F. Supp. at 227, the
court stating that "the association attempted to show that certain segregated schools had not
been affected by defendants' actions and therefore were not required to be desegregated in
formulating a remedy," and that "the remedy should reach only those schools in the system
as to which specific findings as to the effect of segregative actions had been made."
74. The advisory structure is the Citywide Coordinating Council, and is composed of
seven separate subcommittees: (1) Public Information; (2) Monitoring; (3) Community Liai-
son; (4) District Council Liaison; (5) Education Programs; (6) Public Safety and Transporta-
tion; and (7) Executive Committee. 401 F. Supp. at 265-66.
75. Id. at 267.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 267-68.
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desegregative measures at some schools, repair and construction of facilities,
vocational and occupational programs, plans and support of participation by
colleges and universities and business and cultural institutions. The growth of
multi-racial ethnic parent involvement in the REPC's is a basis for great hope
and promise in the Boston school system. The dedication and understanding
of scores of individual members of CPAC and CDAC's is a valuable resource,
second to none, for successful implementation of the Court's desegregation
plan."'
Despite the court's justifiably optimistic remarks regarding cit-
izen participation in the Boston schools, complete harmony among
the various concerned groups has not yet been realized. Many Bos-
ton school administrators assert that their reluctant acceptance of
elected, multiracial parent presence will last only so long as the
court compels that acceptance. 9 Despite these unpleasant ambigui-
ties, parents may now come and go in the Boston schools as a matter
of right, so long as their presence does not disrupt the program of
instruction. These changes do not assure equity in the schools, but
they surely constitute great progress without which there would be
no prospect for equity in the Boston public schools.
These, therefore, are some of the disparate elements that de-
scribe Boston's desegregation experience. Boston's racially segre-
gated dual school system has been substantially dismantled, al-
though employment of minority school personnel and minority
pupil assignment to vocational education have progressed little
from the predesegregation period. The court has effectively forbid-
den the School Committee from engaging in further acts of segrega-
tion. But what of black Boston's initial interest in improving teach-
ing and learning in the Boston schools? Desegregation, in and of
itself, is not after all a necessary occasion of instructional reform for
black pupils. While desegregation does interrupt the more flagrant
discriminatory school practices, it only creates the opportunity for
instructional reform. What use may eventually be made of that
opportunity remains to be seen.
78. Memorandum on Citizen Participation (September 1, 1977) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
79. This conclusion derives from my interviews of seven principals in the Boston public
schools. See note 66 supra.
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